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et al.: Free Exercise of Religion

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
N.Y. CONST. art. , § 3:
The fee exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed in this state to all mankind ....
U.S. CONST. amend. I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, orprohibitingthe free exercise thereof....
COURT OF APPEALS
Fosmire v. Nicoleau 658
(decided January 18, 1990)

Appellee, Denise Nicoleau, an adult Jehovah's Witness,
claimed that a court order "allowing appellant hospital to administer blood transfusions against her will" violated her commonlaw, statutory and constitutional right to make her own medical
decisions as well as her constitutional right to practice her religion free of governmental interference. 659 The court of appeals
affirmed the appellate division's judgment that the supreme court
should not have signed the involuntary treatment order without
first giving appellee notice and an opportunity for, at the minimum, an informal hearing.
As to the merits, the court of appeals held that the patient had a
common law and statutory right to make her own medical decisions. Finding that the hospital had not identified a superior state
interest to override this right, it was not necessary to reach a
constitutional determination on either the patient's right to make
her own medical decision, or her constitutional right to the free
exercise of her religion. 660
658. 75 N.Y.2d 218, 551 N.E.2d 77, 551 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1990).
659. Id. at 223, 551 N.E.2d at 79, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
660. Id. at 225, 551 N.E.2d at 80, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
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Appellee suffered a significant loss of blood following a cesarean section. However, she refused blood transfusions based
upon her religious beliefs and her fear of contracting a communicable disease via blood transfusions. 66 1 Hours after the operation,

the hospital made an application to the court requesting a court
order authorizing the transfusion. The application was supported
by the attending physician's affidavit stating that, in his opinion,
the transfusions were necessary to save the patient's life. 6 62
The supreme court authorized the blood transfusions. However,
neither the patient nor her family received prior notice of the
application to the court. The application had been made about
9:00 a.m. and signed at noon the same day. Notice that the request had been granted, however, was not given until later the
same day. Subsequently, the patient received two blood transfusions, the first at 6:00 p.m., the second, two days later. 663 The
patient then applied for a vacatur of the order. The appellate division vacated the order6 64 and the hospital brought this appeal to
the court of appeals.
In holding that the ex parte order should not have been signed
without notice to the patient and an opportunity to be heard, the
court of appeals also determined that the supreme court
"compounded the error by not providing that they be notified that
the order had been signed so that they could seek prompt review
before the transfusions were given.' 665 The court found that the
nine hour time lapse between the time the hospital's application
was made and the time the first transfusion was given, allowed
ample time for a hearing. 6 66 Consequently, the court noted its
agreement with the appellate division's conclusion that Mrs.
Nicoleau should have been afforded a hearing. Accordingly, the
court reasoned that an "[a]pplication for court ordered medical
treatment affect[s] important rights of the patient[] and should
generally comply with due process requirements of notice and the
661. Id. at 223, 551 N.E.2d at 79, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
662.
663.
664.
665.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

666. Id. at 224-25, 551 N.E.2d at 80, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 875.
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right to be heard before the order is signed." 667 The court noted,
however, that emergency situations may be treated differently. 6 68
On the merits, the court of appeals did not reach the constitutional issues of "whether... [t]he order violate[d] the patient's
constitutional right to religious freedom or to determine the
course of her own medical treatment." ' 669 Instead, the court
found that the patient had a "personal common law and statutory
right to decline the transfusion.", 670 Relying on its previous
holding in Rivers v. Katz,67 1 the court noted that this
fundamental common law right to refuse life sustaining medical
treatment is coextensive with a patient's liberty interests, which
are protected by the state constitution's due process clause, 672
and can be overcome only by a compelling state interest.
Judge Simons concurred in the judgment. He disagreed with
the majority's determination that because no state statute or regulation was called into question, a state constitutional analysis was
not necessary. He reasoned that a court could conclude that the
state's interest in preserving the life of an otherwise healthy person, who was the parent of a minor child, could outweigh the
common law right to refuse treatment, 67 3 thus, rendering an
analysis of the constitutional issues necessary. Judge Simons'
principal concern was that the court's analysis, while stating that
the common law right to refuse medical treatment is subject only
to overriding state interests, in reality, renders an individual's
right to refuse medical treatment absolute. 674 This is because the
court only considered the specific interests raised by the state in
this case, while ignoring other considerations such as the
667. Id.
668. Id. at 225, 551 N.E.2d at 80, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 879; see N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney 1985).

669. Fosmire, 75 N.Y.2d at 225, 551 N.E.2d at 80, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
670. Id.; see Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105
N.E. 92 (1914) (Cardozo, J.).

671. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
672. Fosmire, 75 N.Y.2d at 226, 551 N.E.2d at 81, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
673. Id. at 231-33, 551 N.E.2d at 84-86, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 883-85 (Simons,
J., concurring).

674. Id. at 234, 551 N.E.2d at 86, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
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"[s]tate's commitment to the sanctity of life .... "675
As a Jehovah's Witness, Mrs. Nicoleau refused blood transfusions based on religious beliefs and, therefore, the authorization
to proceed with the transfusions infringed upon her constitutional
right to free exercise of religion. 676 Before overriding her religious beliefs and thus interfering with her fundamental state
constitutional rights, the state "must demonstrate under the strict
scrutiny test that the treatment pursues an unusually important or
compelling goal and that permitting her to avoid the treatment
will hinder the fulfillment of that goal." ' 67 7 Although Judge
Simons found that the state's interest in preserving the life of an
otherwise healthy person, who was the parent of a minor child,
could outweigh the common law right to refuse medical treatment, he concluded that it was not sufficient to constitute the
compelling state interest necessary to overcome the constitutionally mandated right to free exercise of religion. 678 Because there
was no evidence of such a compelling state interest, he would
have affirmed the appellate division's decision. 679
Judge Hancock concurred in the opinion because he agreed that
notice and an opportunity to be heard were necessary in order to
decide what the individual's and society's interests were in order
to weigh them effectively. He stated that society's countervailing
interests must be delicately balanced against the patient's rights.
He also believed that Judge Simons' concurrence, while requiring
a compelling state interest in order to constitutionally infringe
upon the right to free religious exercise, in effect, rendered the
80
patient's right absolute. 6
Judge Hancock then proposed a list of factors to be considered
1
in balancing the "competing individual and societal interests. " 68
675. Id. at 232, 551 N.E.2d at 85, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
676. U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
677. Fosmire, 75 N.Y.2d at 234, 551 N.E.2d 86, 551 N.Y.S.2d 691.
678. Id. at 232, 551 N.E.2d at 84-85, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 883-84.

679. Id. at 234, 551 N.E.2d at 86, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
680. Id. at 235-39, 551 N.E.2d at 86-89, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 885-88 (Hancock, J., concurring).
681. Id. at 238, 551 N.E.2d at 88, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 887 (Hancock, J.,
concurring).
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Judge Hancock stated that the court must consider:
[Tihe precise nature, extent and intensity of the patient's objection to the proposed medical treatment; the type, invasiveness
and effects of that treatment; the nature of the patient's illness;
the necessity or not of the treatment; the patient's prognosis with
and without treatment; the age, maturity and understanding of
the patient; the welfare of the patient's family, particularly their
dependency on the patient and the impact on them if treatment is
68 2
withheld.
In Winters v. Miller,683 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit addressed the issue raised in Judge Hancock's
concurrence. In this case, a Christian Scientist refused basic
medical treatment. The state hospital, however, medicated her
involuntarily and based its decision on the state's parens patriae
power. In so doing, the hospital failed to have the patient
declared incompetent at a judicial hearing before administering
treatment, as is required when a state seeks to exercise its parens
patriae powers. 684 The court wrote that had the hospital given
the patient a chance to testify before a tribunal, the patient could
have convinced the court that she was competent and that other
medical alternatives would have sufficed. "Under our
Constitution there is no procedural right more fundamental than
the right of the citizen, except in extraordinary circumstances, to
tell his side of the story to an impartial tribunal." 6 85 Therefore,
the patient should have been given the opportunity to be heard
before being subjected to unwanted treatment which violated her
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
The United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
held that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard before a prisoner is moved to a mental facility, 6 86 before a
mentally retarded adult is involuntarily committed to an
682. Id. at 238, 551 N.E.2d at 88-89, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88 (Hancock,

J., concurring).
683. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
684. Id. at 710.
685. Id.
686. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
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institution, 6 87 and before an involuntarily committed mentally ill
688
patient is medicated over objection.
In the area of religious freedom, addressed by both Judges
Simons and Hancock in their concurrences, the United States
Supreme Court has stated that where substantial pressure is
placed upon "an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
6 89
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists."
In Winters v. Miller,690 where the court addressed the issue of
refusal of basic medical treatment based upon religious grounds,
the court stated that infringement of one's right to free exercise
of religion can only take place "to prevent grave and immediate
danger .
-691 Although the Fosmire court addressed only
procedural due process rights, the Winters court compared the
standard of review to be used when scrutinizing a state's infringement upon substantive due process protections as opposed
to a state's infringement upon the first amendment right to free
exercise of religion:
Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears
when the specific prohibitions of the First [amendment] become
its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a
public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is
concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of
speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be
infringed on such slender grounds. 692 Thus, the Winters court
recognized the extremely difficult burden the state has in sustaining an infringement upon the free exercise of religion in favor of
administering basic medical treatment.
Other federal courts, however, have been inconsistent when
687. Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386 (6th Cir. 1988).
688. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979).
689. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136,
141 (1987) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Div., 450
U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981)).
690. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).

691. Id. at 69 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943)).
692. Winters, 446 F.2d at 69 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639).
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determining whether the state may authorize life sustaining medical treatment, contrary to a patient's religious based objection,
when death is imminent. In 1964, a United States Court of
Appeals supported state interference with the free exercise of religion because the patient's life "hung in the balance." 693 The
plaintiff was considered incompetent to make a reasoned treatment decision and therefore, the state acted properly in requiring
the hospital to provide life sustaining medical treatment. 694 On
the other hand, in 1972, the same court supported a judge's
decision to reject state intervention when a Jehovah's Witness
rejected life sustaining blood transfusions on religious
grounds. 6 95 Since the patient was competent to make a treatment
decision, the court agreed that there was no sufficient basis for
696
state intervention.
Thus, although the Fosmire court decided the case upon Mrs.
Nicoleau's common law and statutory right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment, the constitutional issues raised by Mrs.
Nicoleau have received a significant amount of attention by the
federal courts. Judge Hancock's concurrence, stressing the vital
nature of notice and an opportunity to be heard before being
medicated involuntarily, is supported by a wide range of federal
case law. On the other hand, the issue of religious freedom as the
motive to refuse life sustaining medical treatment has received
less consistent treatment among the federal courts.

693. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000,
1009 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
694. Id. at 1008.
695. In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
696. Id. at 375.
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